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1. Introduction. This paper extends and unifies two results on the existence of subgame perfect –equi-
librium in games of perfect information, by Flesch et al. [2] and Purves and Sudderth [15]. The setup is as
follows: There are finitely many players. The game lasts infinitely many rounds, and at each round an active
player chooses an action from an arbitrary non–empty set. This induces an infinite sequence of actions, called
play. The payoff to each player is determined as a function of the play.
Flesch et al. [2] prove that a pure subgame perfect –equilibrium exists for every  > 0, provided that the
payoff functions are bounded and lower semicontinuous. Purves and Sudderth [15] prove that a pure subgame
perfect –equilibrium exists for every  > 0, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and upper semi-
continuous. In both cases one takes the discrete topology on the set of actions and the product topology on the
set of plays. The proofs of these two existence results use essentially different techniques.
We introduce a new geometric condition on the payoff functions, which we call common preferences at the
limit, CPL for brevity. While we need CPL to state our existence result, it is instructive to consider a more
restrictive version of the condition, called strong CPL. Roughly speaking, strong CPL says that, for every play
p, if play q is close enough to p, then up to a small error term, all players weakly prefer p over q, or all
players weakly prefer q over p. In particular, strong CPL is satisfied if for every p at least one of the following
statements is true: (1) Every player’s payoff function is lower semicontinuous at p, or (2) Every player’s payoff
function is upper semicontinuous at p. Consequently, strong CPL is satisfied if every player’s payoff function is
everywhere lower semicontinuous, or if every player’s payoff function is everywhere upper semicontinuous. As
a very special case, strong CPL holds whenever the payoff functions of the players are identical. This implies
that there exist strong CPL payoff functions that are nowhere continuous, or that are not Borel measurable.
Our main condition, CPL is more permissive than strong CPL. Intuitively, CPL says that for every play p the
set of plays that are close to p could be partitioned into two subsets in such a way that all plays in the subset
containing p are unanimously ranked below all plays in the other subset. Strong CPL corresponds to the case
where one of the sets in the partition contains all plays weakly preferred to p, and the other set contains all
plays worse than p.
Our main result is that a pure subgame perfect –equilibrium exists for every  > 0 if the payoff functions are
bounded and satisfy CPL. If, in addition, the payoff functions have finite range, then there is a pure subgame
perfect 0–equilibrium.
The proof technique is as follows: We know that there exists a strategy profile that is immune to one–shot
deviations (that is, deviations at a single time period), by a result by Flesch et al. [2]. The main challenge is
ensuring that deviations at infinitely many time periods are not profitable.
The first step of the proof is to construct a strategy profile that is immune to one–shot deviations with an
additional feature: Whenever in a given subgame there is a payoff vector that is unanimously preferred to any
other feasible payoff vector, the strategy profile yields that payoff vector. The crucial step is then to show that
if play p is obtained by a deviation at infinitely many periods while q is obtained by a deviation at finitely
many periods, then q is in the upper element of the partition relative to p, and therefore is unanimously weakly
preferred to p.
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Related literature: Existence of a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium has been established under various con-
ditions, see for example Fudenberg and Levine [7], Harris [8], and Maitra and Sudderth [12]. Typically, it is
assumed that the payoff functions satisfy some form of continuity. Very general topological conditions for the
existence of subgame perfect 0–equilibrium are given in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger [1].
For results on the existence of subgame perfect –equilibrium, see Solan and Vieille [16], Solan [17], Flesch
et al. [3], Laraki et al. [10], and Mashiah–Yaakovi [11], and Flesch and Predtetchinski [6, 5].
Solan and Vieille [16] present an example of a game that does not admit subgame perfect –equilibrium
in pure strategies for small . Recently Flesch et al. [4] gave an example of a game that does not admit any
subgame perfect –equilibrium for small , not even in behavior strategies. Both games have Borel measurable
payoff functions, and only three different payoff vectors.
Structure of the paper: In Section 2, we define the model. In Section 3, we introduce the property of
common preferences at the limit. In Section 4, we state and discuss the main results. Sections 5 and 6 present
the formal proofs. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and discusses avenues for future research.
2. The model.
The game: Let N = 811 : : : 1 n9 denote the set of players and let A be an arbitrary non–empty set. Let
 = 8011121 : : : 9. We denote by H the set of all finite sequences of elements of A, including the empty
sequence ø. We denote by P = A the set of all infinite sequences of elements of A. The elements of A are
called actions, the elements of H are called histories, and the elements of P are called plays. There is a function
2 H →N that assigns an active player to each history. Furthermore, each player i ∈N is given a payoff function
ui2 P→.
The game is played as follows: Player 4ø5 chooses an action a0. Suppose that up to period t ∈ of the game
the sequence h= 4a01 : : : 1 at5 of actions has been chosen. Then player 4h5 chooses an action at+1. The chosen
action is observed by all players. Continuing this way the players generate a play p= 4a01 a11 : : : 5, and finally
each player i ∈N receives payoff ui4p5.
Strategies: We only consider pure strategies. Thus we omit the qualification “pure” in the sequel. A strategy
for player i is a function i2 
−14i5→ A, where −14i5 is the set of histories where player i moves. A strategy
profile is a tuple 411 : : : 1n5 where each i is a strategy for player i. Given a strategy profile  = 411 : : : 1n5
and a strategy i for player i, we write /i to denote the strategy profile obtained from  by replacing i
with i.
For the concatenation of histories and actions we use the following notations: Take a history h= 4a01 : : : 1 at5 ∈
H . For an action b ∈ A, we denote the sequence 4a01 : : : 1 at1 b5 by 4h1 b5 or hb. For a sequence of actions
4b01 b11 : : : 5 we let 4h1 b01 b11 : : : 5 denote the play 4a01 : : : 1 at1 b01 b11 : : : 5.
We can identify a strategy profile  with a function 2 H →A. Define the play induced by  starting from
the history h, denoted by 41h5, inductively as follows: Let h0 = h. If ht has been defined for some t ≥ 0,
then let at = 4ht5 and set ht+1 = 4ht1 at5. Then 41h5= 4h1a01 a11 : : : 5. For the special case h= ø, we write
45=41ø5.
Subgame perfect –equilibrium: Let ≥ 0 be an error–term. A strategy profile  is called an –equilibrium
if no player can gain more than  by a unilateral deviation, i.e., if for each player i ∈ N and for each strategy
 ′i of player i it holds that
ui4455≥ ui44/ ′i 55− 0
Subgame perfect –equilibrium, –SPE, requires that the strategy profile induces an –equilibrium in every
subgame. That is, for each history h ∈H , each player i ∈N , and each strategy  ′i of player i it holds that
ui441h55≥ ui44/ ′i 1 h55− 0
A 0–equilibrium is called an equilibrium, and a 0–SPE is called an SPE. Without strong conditions, both
can fail to exist, even in one–player games. Suppose for example that a player must choose a natural number,
and his payoff is 1 − 1/n if he chooses n ∈ . In this game, the player has obviously no optimal strategy, and
therefore the game admits no equilibrium and no SPE. As a similar example, suppose that a player can choose
to stop or to continue at time periods t ∈ ; his payoff is 1 − 1/t if he decides to stop the game at period t
and his payoff is 0 if he never stops. Note that for all  > 0 both games admit an –SPE, e.g., choosing any
n≥ 1/ in the first game, and in the second game choosing to continue at periods t < 1/ and choosing to stop
at periods t ≥ 1/.
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One–deviation immune profile: For our proof, the concept of a one-deviation immune profile is important.
A strategy profile  is said to be one-deviation immune if
u4h5441h55≥ u4h5441ha55 for each h ∈H1 a ∈A0 (1)
Thus a strategy profile  is one-deviation immune if the active player cannot improve his payoff at any history h
by deviating from  only at history h. It follows by induction that a one-deviation immune profile automatically
satisfies the finite-deviation property: No player can improve his payoff, in any subgame, by deviating from 
at a finite number of histories. Any SPE is a one-deviation immune profile, but not vice versa.
The topological structure: We endow the action set A with the discrete topology and the set of plays P
with the product topology. The topology on P is completely metrizable,1 and a basis of this topology is formed
by the cylinder sets O4h5= 8p ∈ P2 h≺ p9 for h ∈H , where for a history h ∈H and a play p ∈ P we write
h≺ p if h is the initial segment of p. Thus a sequence of plays 4pn5n∈ converges to a play p precisely when
for every k ∈ there exists an Nk ∈ such that pn coincides with p on the first k coordinates for every n≥Nk.
A function f 2 P →  is said to be continuous at a play p ∈ P if, for every sequence of plays 4pn5n∈
converging to p, we have limn→ f 4pn5 = f 4p5. Thus, f is continuous at p precisely when for every  > 0
there is an N ∈  such that if a play q coincides with p on the first N coordinates then f 4p5− f 4q5 ≤ .
Intuitively, continuity of f at p says that changing the actions in p at distant stages of the game has little effect
on the value of f . Further, f is said to be continuous if it is continuous at each play in P.
A function f 2 P →  is said to be lower semicontinuous at a play p ∈ P if, for every sequence of plays
4pn5n∈ converging to p, we have lim infn→ f 4pn5≥ f 4p5. We say that f is lower semicontinuous if it is lower
semicontinuous at each play in P.
A function f 2 P →  is said to be upper semicontinuous at a play p ∈ P if, for every sequence of plays
4pn5n∈ converging to p, we have lim supn→ f 4pn5≤ f 4p5. We say that f is upper semicontinuous if it is upper
semicontinuous at each play in P.
Existence results: Mertens and Neyman (cf. Mertens [14]) showed, by using the result of Martin [13],
that if each player’s payoff function is bounded and Borel measurable then an –equilibrium exists for every
 > 0. An –SPE (in pure strategies) does not necessarily exist under these conditions, as was demonstrated by
examples in Solan and Vieille [16] and in Flesch et al. [4] (the latter has no –SPE even in behavior strategies).
The following two sufficient conditions for the existence of –SPE are important for this paper.
Theorem 2.1 (Flesch et al. [2]). If for each player i the payoff function ui is bounded and lower semi-
continuous, then the game admits an –SPE for each  > 0. If in addition, the payoff functions have finite range,
then the game admits an SPE.
Theorem 2.2 (Purves and Sudderth [15]). If for each player i the payoff function ui is bounded and
upper semicontinuous, then the game admits an –SPE for each  > 0. If in addition, the payoff functions have
finite range, then the game admits an SPE.
Underlying Theorem 2.1 is the fact that any game with finitely many payoffs admits a one-deviation immune
profile.2
Theorem 2.3 (Flesch et al. [2]). If for each player i the payoff function ui has finite range, then the game
admits a one-deviation immune profile.
In general, a one-deviation immune profile need not be an SPE. However, if the payoff functions are lower
semicontinuous, then a strategy profile is an SPE if and only if it is a one-deviation immune profile. Therefore
Theorem 2.1 is an straightforward corollary of Theorem 2.3.
Orders on n: For vectors v and w in n we write v≤w if ∀ i ∈N4vi ≤wi5, we write v <w if v≤w and
v 6=w, and we write vw if ∀ i ∈N4vi <wi5.
1 One can take for example the metric d2 P×P→ which is defined for each p, q ∈P as follows: If p= q then d4p1q5= 0. Otherwise,
d4p1q5= 2−m4p1q5 where m4p1q5 ∈ is the first coordinate on which p and q differ.
2 This statement is proven but not explicitly stated in Flesch et al. [2].
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Figure 1. Lower semicontinuity, upper semicontinuity, and strong CPL.
3. Common preferences at the limit. In this section, we introduce a new geometric condition on the payoff
functions, which we call common preferences at the limit. While we only need CPL to state our main results,
a stronger version of the condition, called strong CPL, warrants some attention, as it encompasses a number of
important special cases. Thus we begin our discussion with strong CPL, and then continue with CPL.
Consider a payoff function u2 P → n given by u4p5 = 4u14p51 : : : 1 un4p55. The graph of u is the set
84p1u4p55  p ∈ P9, a subset of P×n. Let Gu denote the closure of the graph of u. Furthermore, for a play
p ∈P let Gu4p5 denote the p–section of Gu, that is Gu4p5= 8v ∈n  4p1 v5 ∈Gu9.
Flesch et al. [2] assume that each player i’s payoff function ui is lower semicontinuous, or equivalently that
for every p ∈ P and every v ∈ Gu4p5 it holds that u4p5 ≤ v. The assumption in Purves and Sudderth [15] is
that each player i’s payoff function ui is upper semicontinuous, or equivalently that for every p ∈P and every
v ∈Gu4p5 it holds that u4p5≥ v. This brings us to the following definition:
Definition 3.1. The payoff function u is said to exhibit strong common preferences at the limit, strong
CPL, if for every p ∈P and every v ∈Gu4p5 it holds that u4p5≤ v or u4p5≥ v.
The three panels of Figure 1 illustrate the definitions of lower semicontinuity, upper semicontinuity, and strong
CPL, respectively, in the case of two players. In each case the set Gu4p5 should be contained in the shaded area.
Strong CPL is satisfied if for every play p ∈ P at least one of the following statements is true: (1) Every
player i’s payoff function ui is lower semicontinuous at p, or (2) Every player i’s the payoff function ui is upper
semicontinuous at p. Consequently, strong CPL is satisfied if every player’s payoff function is everywhere lower
semicontinuous, or if every player’s payoff function is everywhere upper semicontinuous. Note however that
strong CPL does not exclude that u4p5≤ v for some v ∈Gu4p5 while u4p5≥ v for other v ∈Gu4p5.
Here is an example of an infinite centipede game with payoff functions that exhibit strong CPL, but at some
plays are neither lower semicontinuous nor upper semicontinuous.
Example 3.2. Consider the following 2–player game: The action set is A= 8s1 c9, where s stands for stop
and c for continue. The players choose actions alternatingly, and as soon as a player chooses action s, the game
ends.3 The payoffs are 4−21−15 if player 1 ends the game, 41125 if player 2 ends the game, and 40105 if the
players never play action s. This is shown in the following figure:
p1
(–2, –1)
s
c
s
c
s
c
s
c
p2 p2p1
(1, 2)(–2, –1)(1, 2)
… (0, 0)
The payoff functions are neither lower nor upper semicontinuous at the play p= 4c1 c1 : : : 5, and are contin-
uous everywhere else. To verify strong CPL, it suffices to consider the play p. The set Gu4p5 consists of the
vectors 40105, 4−21−15, and 41125, but since u4p5= 40105≤ 41125 and u4p5= 40105≥ 4−21−15, strong CPL
holds. Ã
As shown by the example above, strong CPL payoff functions need not be semicontinuous. In fact, strong CPL
payoff functions might be very “irregular.” There exist strong CPL payoff functions that are nowhere continuous,
and there exist strong CPL payoff functions that are not Borel measurable (with respect to the chosen topology
on P). Indeed, let f 2 P→ be an arbitrary function. Define u1 = · · · = un = f . In this case, all payoff functions
are identical, so strong CPL is trivially satisfied.
We now turn to our main definition.
3 Strictly speaking, the game goes on, but once action s has been played, subsequent actions do not affect the payoffs.
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Definition 3.3. The payoff function u is said to exhibit common limit preferences, CPL, if there exists a
function s2 P→n such that for every p ∈P the following are satisfied: (1) u4p5≤ s4p5; (2) There is v ∈Gu4p5
such that s4p5≤ v; and (3) For every v ∈Gu4p5 either v≤ s4p5 or s4p5≤ v. In this case, the function s is called
a splitting function associated with u.
Note that u exhibits strong CPL exactly when it exhibits CPL with the splitting function s = u. The following
game exhibits CPL, but not strong CPL:
Example 3.4. Consider the following 2–player game: The action set is A= 8s1 c9, where s stands for stop
and c for continue. The players choose actions alternatingly, and as soon as a player chooses action s, the game
ends. The payoffs are 41115 if the game ends at a period 4k, 4−1115 if it ends at a period 4k+ 1, 411−15 if it
ends at a period 4k+ 2, 42125 if it ends at a period 4k+ 3, and 40105 if the game never ends. This is shown in
the following figure:
p1 p2 p1 p2 p1
s
c
s
c
s
c
s
c
s
c
(1, 1) (–1, 1) (1, –1) (2, 2) (1, 1)
… (0, 0)
Again, to verify (strong) CPL, it suffices to consider the play p = 4c1 c1 : : : 5. We have v ∈ Gu4p5 for any
of the five payoff vectors v in the game. Since u4p5 = 40105 and 411−15 are not ≤–comparable, the payoffs
do not satisfy strong CPL. However, by choosing s4p5= 41115, we find that the payoffs do exhibit CPL. See
Figure 2. Ã
Examples of games that do not have an –SPE in pure strategies are given in Solan and Vieille [16] and
Flesch et al. [4]. In both examples the payoffs violate CPL, as shown below.
Example 3.5 (Solan and Vieille [16]). Consider the following 2–player game: The action set is A =
8s1 c9, where s stands for stop and c for continue. The players choose actions in turn, and as soon as a player
chooses action s, the game ends. The payoffs are 4−1125 if player 1 ends the game, 4−2115 if player 2 ends
the game, and 40105 if the players never play action s. This is shown in the following figure:
p1
(–1, 2)
p2 p1 p2
s
c
s
c
s
c
s
c
(–2, 1) (–1, 2) (–2, 1)
… (0, 0)
Since for the play p= 4c1 c1 : : : 5 the set Gu4p5 consists of the points 4−2115, 4−1125, and 40105, the payoff
function u cannot satisfy conditions (1)–(3) of CPL for any splitting function s. Note that, as Solan and Vieille
argue, this game admits no pure –SPE, but it does have an –SPE in behavior strategies. Ã
u (p) = (0, 0)
s (p) = (1, 1)
(1, –1)
(–1, 1)
(2, 2)
Figure 2. The game in Example 3.4.
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Example 3.6 (Flesch et al. [4]). Consider the following 2–player game: The action set is A = 81129.
Player 1 starts the game. The active player decides who the next active player is by choosing the corresponding
action. The payoffs are 4−1125 if player 2 is active only finitely many times, 4−2115 if player 1 is active only
finitely many times, and 40105 if both players are active infinitely many times.
For any play p the set Gu4p5 consists of the points 4−2115, 4−1125, and 40105, so the payoff function u
cannot satisfy conditions (1)–(3) of CPL for any splitting function s. As Flesch et al. argue, this game admits
no –SPE for small , not even in behavior strategies. Ã
Suppose that the payoff function u exhibits CPL, and let s be an associated splitting function. Consider a
play p such that for each player i ∈N , player i’s payoff function ui is upper semicontinuous at p. Then v≤ u4p5
for each v ∈ Gu4p5. Hence conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 3.3 imply that u4p5 = s4p5. We discuss the
connection between upper semicontinuity and splitting functions in more detail in §7.
A zero–sum game satisfies CPL if and only if the payoff function is continuous. This could be considered a
limitation of CPL as every zero–sum game has an –SPE provided only that the payoff function is bounded and
Borel measurable, a result that could be proven using Martin’s Borel determinacy (1975).
4. The main results. In this section, we present our main results.
Theorem 4.1. If the payoff function u = 4u11 : : : 1 un5 is bounded and exhibits common preferences at the
limit, then the game admits an –SPE for every  > 0.
Note that Theorem 4.1 does not claim that there exists an SPE (see examples in §2). We do obtain existence
of SPE if the payoff function has finite range in addition.
Theorem 4.2. If the payoff function u= 4u11 : : : 1 un5 has finite range and exhibits common preferences at
the limit, then the game admits an SPE.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 uses a result in Flesch et al. [2], cf. Theorem 2.3 above on the existence of a one-
deviation immune profile. As already mentioned, the one–deviation property automatically implies, by induction,
the finite-deviation property, in the sense that no player i can improve his payoff, in any subgame, by deviating
from i finitely many times. The main challenge is to make sure that deviating infinitely many times is not
profitable either.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 proceeds in a sequence of steps. First, we argue that we can perturb the payoffs
slightly to obtain a new payoff function without ties (Lemma 5.1). Second, we construct a one-deviation immune
profile  with an additional feature: In a subgame, whenever there is a feasible payoff, say v, that is unanimously
preferred to any other feasible payoff,  leads to the payoff of v (Lemma 5.2, this is where we use Theorem 2.3).
Finally, we argue that  is an SPE. The crucial point is that for any play p and any sufficiently long history
h≺ p, the payoff induced by  starting at h is bounded below by s4p5, and therefore also by u4p5. This implies
that a deviation leading to p cannot be profitable.
Subsequently we show that each bounded CPL payoff function u admits a CPL discretization, that is, a CPL
payoff function u¯ with finite range that is –close to u. Theorem 4.1 then follows at once from Theorem 4.2.
Throughout the paper we assume the Axiom of Choice.
5. The proof of Theorem 4.2. The payoff function u is said to have a tie if there are two payoffs v and w
in the range of u such that v 6=w but v4i5=w4i5 for some player i ∈ 811 : : : 1 n9.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the payoff function u has a finite range and exhibits CPL. Then, there is a payoff
function u′ such that (1) u′ has a finite range without ties, (2) u′ exhibits CPL, and (3) any SPE with respect
to u′ is also an SPE with respect to u.
Proof. Let u have a finite range and exhibit CPL. Clearly, we can assume without loss of generality that
the splitting function s has a finite range, too. Let v11 : : : 1 vm be an enumeration of the union of the range of u
and the range of s such that if vj ≤ vk then j ≤ k. Let  > 0 be so small that whenever vj4i5 6= vk4i5, for some
j , k ∈ 811 : : : 1m9 and i ∈ 811 : : : 1 n9, then 41/m5 · vj4i5− vk4i5>.
By construction, for all j , k ∈ 811 : : : 1m9 and all i ∈ 811 : : : 1 n9 we have the following two properties: (A) If
vj4i5 < vk4i5, then vj4i5+ j < vk4i5 < vk4i5+k, and (B) If vj4i5= vk4i5 and j < k then vj4i5+ j < vk4i5+k.
Define new functions u′ and s′ as follows: For each p ∈ P let u′4p5 = vk + kn if u4p5 = vk. Similarly, let
s′4p5= vk + kn if s4p5= vk, where n = 41 : : : 1 5 ∈n. The union of the range of u′ and the range of s′ is
the set of m payoff vectors v1 + n1 : : : 1 vm +mn.
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To see that u′ has no ties suppose that vj4i5+ j= vk4i5+ k for some player i. However, then by (A) and
(B) it holds that vj4i5= vk4i5 and j = k, so vj + jn = vk + kn. Thus u′ satisfies property (1) of the lemma.
To see that u′ has property (2), note that vj ≤ vk implies that j ≤ k, and consequently that vj + jn ≤ vk +kn.
Hence for p1q ∈ P if u4p5≤ s4q5 then u′4p5≤ s′4q5, and if u4p5≥ s4q5 then u′4p5≥ s′4q5. Thus u′ exhibits
CPL with s′ as an associated splitting function. Property (2) follows.
Finally, to show that property (3) holds, observe that by (A) if ui4p5 < ui4q5 for some plays p1q ∈ P, then
also u′i4p5 < u
′
i4q5.
Given a history h ∈ H let U4h5 = 8u4q5  q  h9. For histories h and h′ we write h  h′ if h′ = h or h′
extends h. In this case U4h5⊇U4h′5.
The next lemma says that there is a one-deviation immune profile  such that whenever in a subgame starting
at h there is a feasible payoff, say vh, that is unanimously preferred to any other feasible payoff, then  leads
to the payoff of vh in the given subgame. The lemma applies to any payoff function with finitely many values,
and does not use CPL.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that the payoff function u has finite range. Then the game admits a one-deviation
immune profile  with the following property: If for a history h ∈H there exists a payoff vh ∈ U4h5 such that
v≤ vh for every v ∈U4h5, then u441h55= vh.
Proof. Let M denote the set of histories h ∈H for which there exists a payoff vh ∈U4h5 such that v′ ≤ vh
for every v′ ∈U4h5. Clearly, there exists a strategy profile  such that u441h55= vh for every h ∈M .
Let M+ denote the set of histories of the form 4h′1 a5 where h′ ∈M but 4h′1 a5 6∈M . As a special case, we
also include the root history ø in M+ if ø 6∈M . For every history h 6∈M , let 4h5 denote the longest history h′
with h′  h and h′ ∈M+.
For every h ∈M+, consider the payoff function wh which we define for every play p ∈P as follows:
Case 1: If p begins with h and enters M afterwards, i.e., if h≺ p and there is a history h′ ∈M such that
h≺ h′ ≺ p. In this case, assume that h′ is minimal with this property. We set wh4p5= vh′ .
Case 2: Otherwise, we set wh4p5= u4p5.
By Theorem 2.3, there is a one-deviation immune profile h for the payoff function wh.
Now we are ready to define the strategy profile  . Intuitively, whenever play is in M then  follows  and
gives the unanimously preferred payoff; whenever play leaves M , say at a history h′ ∈M+, then  follows h′
as long as M is not entered again. Now we provide a formal definition. Take a history h ∈H . We distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: If h ∈M . In this case, we set 4h5= 4h5.
Case 2: If h 6∈M . In this case, we set 4h5= 4h54h5.
Since  coincides with  on M , we have u441h55= u441h55= vh for all h ∈M , so it is clear that 
satisfies that additional property in the lemma. It remains to verify that  is a one-deviation immune profile.
Clearly, no single deviation at a history h ∈ M can be profitable, since u441h55 = vh. Now suppose that
h 6∈M . Note that
u441h55=w4h5444h51 h550 (2)
Indeed, if 41h5 never enters M after h then 41h5 = 44h51 h5 and hence by case 2 of the definition
of wh, (2) holds. Otherwise 41h5 and 44h51 h5 enter M at the very same history h′′ ∈ M and then both
u441h55 and w4h5444h51 h55 are equal to vh
′′
, and (2) holds again. For every history h 6∈ M and action
a ∈A we have
u441ha55=w4h5444h51 ha550 (3)
Indeed, if ha 6∈ M , this is an instance of (2), and if ha ∈ M , then the left and the right–hand sides are equal
to vha. Because 4h5 is a one-deviation immune profile for w4h5, it follows from (2) and (3) that
u4h5441h55=w4h54h5 444h51 h55≥w4h54h5 444h51 ha55= u4h5441ha550
Hence,  is a one-deviation immune profile. 
Example 5.3. Consider the following 1-player game. The action set is A= 8s1 c9, where s stands for stop
and c for continue. As soon as the player chooses action s the game ends with payoff 0, whereas always
playing action c gives payoff 1. The strategy that always chooses action s is clearly a one-deviation immune
profile, even though the optimal payoff is 1. Note that always choosing action c is also a one-deviation immune
profile, yielding this optimal payoff, and that this strategy now also satisfies the additional requirement of
Lemma 5.2. Ã
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Suppose that the payoff function u has finite range. For a play p let hk be the prefix of p of length k.
Clearly U4h05 ⊇ U4h15 ⊇ · · · is a non–increasing sequence of finite sets. Hence there is a k ∈  such that
U4hk5 = U4hk+15 = · · · . Clearly, Gu4p5 = U4hk5. Letting k be the least number with this property, we set
h4p5= hk. Let H4p5= 8h ∈H  h4p5 h≺ p9.
Define X as the set consisting of all plays p ∈ P such that u4p5 ≥ v for each v ∈ Gu4p5. We remark that
p ∈X if and only if for every player i the payoff function ui is upper semicontinuous at p. Note also that if 
is a strategy profile as in Lemma 5.2 then
u441h55= u4p5 for every p ∈X and h ∈H4p50 (4)
Lemma 5.4. Suppose that the payoff function u has finite range and exhibits CPL. Let s be a splitting
function for u. Then, for each p ∈P and h ∈H4p5, there is a q  h such that q ∈X and s4p5≤ u4q5.
Proof. Take a p ∈P and an h ∈H4p5. Take a y ∈Gu4p5 such that ¬∃v ∈Gu4p54y < v5, i.e., some y which
is maximal in Gu4p5 with respect to ≤. Such a vector y exists since Gu4p5 is finite. First we argue that s4p5≤ y.
By CPL either y < s4p5 or s4p5 ≤ y. Suppose y < s4p5. Take a v ∈ Gu4p5 such that s4p5 ≤ v. However, then
y < v, contradicting the choice of y. Hence s4p5≤ y, as desired.
By the choice of h we have Gu4p5 = U4h5. Hence y ∈ U4h5, so there is a q  h such that y = u4q5. Note
that Gu4q5⊆U4h5=Gu4p5.
We know that s4p5≤ y = u4q5≤ s4q5. Take a v ∈Gu4q5 such that s4q5≤ v. Since it is not the case that y < v,
we must have y = v, and we conclude that y = s4q5. Now for each w ∈Gu4q5 either w ≤ s4q5 or s4q5 < w. The
latter is impossible as it implies y <w. We thus conclude that w ≤ s4q5= y = u4q5. This proves that q ∈X.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose that the payoff function u has finite range without ties, and exhibits CPL. Let s be a
splitting function for u. Let the strategy profile  be as in Lemma 5.2. Then u441h55≥ s4p5 for each p ∈P
and each h ∈H4p5.
Proof. Take a p ∈P and an h ∈H4p5. By Lemma 5.4 there is a q  h such that q ∈X and s4p5≤ u4q5.
If h4q5 h then h ∈H4q5 and hence u4q5= u441h55 by (4). Therefore s4p5≤ u441h55, as desired.
Suppose now that h ≺ h4q5. Write h4q5 = ha1: : : aK and let h0 = h, and for each k ∈ 811 : : : 1K9 let
hk = hk−1ak. In particular hK = h4q5. We show that
u441hk55≥ s4p5 (5)
for all k ∈ 801 : : : 1K9. For k=K, inequality (5) holds because s4p5≤ u4q5= u441h4q555, where the equality
is a consequence of (4). Suppose (5) holds for some k ≥ 1. We prove that (5) also holds for k − 1. Letting
i= 4hk−15 we have the chain of inequalities
ui441hk−155≥ ui441hk−1ak55= ui441hk55≥ si4p51 (6)
where the first inequality is an instance of (1), and the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose first that ui441hk−155 > si4p5. Then since hk−1 ∈ H4p5, CPL implies that u441hk−155 ≥ s4p5.
Suppose now that ui441hk−155= si4p5. Then by (6), ui441hk−155= ui441hk55, and since u has no ties,
u441hk−155= u441hk55. Hence the induction hypothesis implies that u441hk−155≥ s4p5, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let u be a payoff function with finite range and CPL with a splitting function s.
By Lemma 5.1 we can assume that u has no ties. Let the strategy profile  be as in Lemma 5.2. We show that
 is an SPE.
Let h be any history and i a strategy for player i. We want to prove that
ui441h55≥ ui44/i1 h550
Write = /i. Let p=41h5 and let h01 h11 h21 : : : be the successive enumeration of the initial segments
of the play p starting from h, that is h0 = h and hk+1 = hk4hk5 for each k. We have
ui441hk55≥ ui441hk4hk555= ui441hk+155 (7)
Indeed, at histories hk that belong to player i, the inequality is an instance of (1) with a= 4hk5. At histories hk
that do not belong to player i, the inequality holds as we have 4hk5= 4hk5 and so 41hk5=41hk4hk55.
Hence we have a non–increasing chain of payoffs:
ui441h055≥ ui441h155≥ · · · ≥ ui441hk55≥ · · ·
Moreover for large k we have hk ∈ H4p5 and hence by Lemma 5.5, ui441hk55 ≥ si4p5 ≥ ui4p5. Thus
ui441h055≥ ui4p5, as desired.
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Figure 3. Illustration of Lemma 6.3.
6. The proof of Theorem 4.1. For a vector v in n let v = max8v11 : : : 1 vn9. Let G be the set of
functions g2 P → n. A function g¯ ∈ G is said to be an –discretization of the payoff function g ∈ G if g¯ has
finite range and g4p5− g¯4p5 <  for each p ∈ P. We say that a subset G′ of G is discretizable if for each
g ∈G′ and each  > 0, g has an –discretization g¯ that is also an element of G′.
In this section we prove the following two related results:
Theorem 6.1. The set of bounded strong CPL functions is discretizable.
Theorem 6.2. The set of bounded CPL functions is discretizable.
Once Theorem 6.2 is proven, Theorem 4.1 follows from Theorem 4.2. Indeed, if u¯ is an –discretization of u,
then any SPE relative to u¯ is a 2–SPE relative to u.
Flesch et al. [2] prove that the set of bounded and lower semicontinuous payoff functions is discretizable,
while Purves and Sudderth [15] show that the set of bounded and upper semicontinuous payoff functions is
discretizable. Both proofs are straightforward. For example if u is bounded and lower semicontinuous, then a
lower semicontinuous –discretization of u is given by u¯i4p5 = ui4p5/, where a is the largest integer
strictly smaller than a.
Unlike the case of semicontinuous functions, our proof is more involved. In particular, we were unable to
construct an –discretization of u of the form u¯4p5= t4u4p55 for any function t2 n →n. In our construction
u¯4p5 generally depends not only on u4p5 but also on p itself.
Given a partial order E on a set X we say that the points x and y of X are E–comparable if xEy or yEx. A
subset S of X is said to be an E–chain if for all x1 y ∈ S the points x and y are E–comparable. For the points v
and y of n we write v y if ∀ i ∈N4vi < yi + 5 and we write v≤ y if ∀ i ∈N4vi ≤ yi + 5.
Fix a bounded function g ∈G with strong CPL, and a bounded function u ∈G with CPL. Fix also an  > 0.
We shall construct a strong CPL –discretization of g and a CPL –discretization of u.
Let M be a positive multiple of  such that −M ≤ gi4p5≤M and −M ≤ ui4p5≤M for all p ∈P and all i.
Let F be the set of points x ∈ 6−M1M7n such that each coordinate xi is a multiple of . The set F serves as a
grid, and the range of the discretized payoff functions will be contained in it.
Lemma 6.3. Let C ⊆ F be a ≤–chain and y ∈ 6−M1M7n. Suppose that for each x ∈C, the points x and y
are –comparable. Then there exists an element y¯ ∈ F such that
• y¯− y<  and
• for each x ∈C, if x y then x≤ y¯ and if ¬4x y5 then y¯ ≤ x.
Figure 3 illustrates the idea behind Lemma 6.3 for the two–player case. Points of the grid are elements
of F. The black dots are the elements of C. Note that C is indeed an ≤–chain. Also pictured is a point
y ∈ 6−M1M72, and a point y¯ ∈ F satisfying the condition of the lemma. The point y¯ is also the point chosen
under the construction in the proof of the lemma below.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. We assume that there is an x ∈ C such that x  y. Otherwise add the point
4−M1 : : : 1−M5 to the set C. Let x4151 : : : 1 x4k5 be an enumeration of C such that x415≤ · · · ≤ x4k5. Let m
be the maximal number such that x4m5 y.
Let ai be the largest multiple of  that is smaller than or equal to yi, and bi be the smallest multiple of  that
is greater than or equal to yi. Then ai ≤ yi ≤ bi and bi − ai is 0 or . Define
y¯i =
{
ai if xi4m5≤ yi
bi otherwise.
Note that y¯ is in F.
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We show that x4`5≤ y¯ if `≤m and y¯ ≤ x4`5 if m< `.
Consider an element x4`5 of C with ` ≤ m. We have x4`5 ≤ x4m5 and we show that x4m5 ≤ y¯. Take an i.
Suppose first xi4m5≤ yi. Then y¯i = ai. Since xi4m5 is a multiple of  we have xi4m5≤ ai by the definition of ai.
Hence xi4m5≤ y¯i. Now suppose that yi < xi4m5 so that y¯i = bi. Then yi < xi4m5 < yi + . Therefore bi = xi4m5
and hence y¯i = xi4m5.
Consider an element x4`5 of C with m< `. Since it is not the case that x4`5 y we have y  x4`5. We
argue that y¯ ≤ x4`5. Take any i. Suppose first that xi4m5≤ yi, in which case y¯i = ai. Then ai ≤ yi < xi4`5+ ,
and hence ai < xi4`5+ , therefore ai ≤ xi4`5. Hence y¯i ≤ xi4`5. Now suppose that yi < xi4m5, in which case
y¯i = bi. Then yi < xi4m5≤ xi4`5. Since xi4`5 is a multiple of , the definition of bi implies that bi ≤ xi4`5. Thus
y¯i ≤ xi4`5.
Lemma 6.4 below roughly speaking states the following: Take a play q. If p is close to q and if vector x is
close to the payoff vector g4q5, then g4p5 and x are –comparable. This follows since by strong CPL, if p is
close to q, then g4p5 is “almost” ≤–comparable to g4q5.
Lemma 6.4. For each q ∈ P, there exists a history `4q5≺ q such that, for each p  `4q5 and each x ∈ F
with g4q5− x< , the points g4p5 and x are –comparable.
Proof. Suppose that there is a q ∈ P such that for every history h ≺ q there is a p  h and x ∈ F with
g4q5− x<  such that the points g4p5 and x are not –comparable. Then there is a sequence pt ∈ P and
xt ∈ F such that pt → q, g4q5− xt<  but the points g4pt5 and xt are not –comparable. As F is a finite
set we can take xt to be a constant sequence, xt = x. Since g has bounded range, by taking a subsequence we
may assume that g4pt5 converges, say to a point y ∈Gg4q5. As g has strong CPL, y and g4q5 are ≤–comparable.
Because g4q5−x< , the points y and x are –comparable. However, then g4pt5 and x are –comparable
for t large enough, thus yielding a contradiction.
The following is a straightforward characterization of strong CPL for functions with finite range.
Lemma 6.5. Let g¯2 P → n be a function with finite range. Then g¯ has strong CPL if and only if there is
¯`2 P→H such that (1) for every p ∈P, ¯`4p5≺ p and (2) for every p1q ∈P if the histories ¯`4p5 and ¯`4q5 are
–comparable, the vectors g¯4p5 and g¯4q5 are ≤–comparable.
Proof. Suppose g¯ has strong CPL. As in §5, for every h ∈ H define U4h5 = 8g¯4p5  h ≺ p9 and for each
p ∈ P let h4p5 be least prefix of p such that U4h4p55=Gg¯4p5. We show that h2 P →H satisfies conditions
(1) and (2) of the lemma. Condition (1) is clearly satisfied. To prove (2) take p1q ∈ P such that the histories
h4p5 and h4q5 are –comparable. Without loss of generality assume that h4p5 h4q5. Then g¯4q5 ∈U4h4q55⊆
U4h4p55=Gg¯4p5. By strong CPL, g¯4q5 is ≤–comparable to g¯4p5.
Conversely, suppose that there is a function ¯` that meets conditions (1) and (2). Take p ∈ P and v ∈Gg¯4p5.
Then there exists a q ∈P such that v= g¯4q5 and ¯`4p5≺ q. As ¯`4q5≺ q by (1), the histories ¯`4p5 and ¯`4q5 are
–comparable. Hence by (2) the vectors g¯4q5= v and g¯4p5 are ≤–comparable. Thus g¯ has strong CPL. 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6.1. The main instrument we use is induction and recursion on
a well-founded relation (see e.g., Jech [9], Theorems 6.10 and 6.11). We construct a well-founded relation on
the set of plays that orders p below q if the history `4p5 is a prefix of the history `4q5, where the function ` is
as in Lemma 6.4. The discretized payoff function g¯ is then defined by recursion on this well-founded relation.
Essentially this means that if p is ordered below q then the discretized payoff g¯4p5 is defined before g¯4q5.
By ordering the plays in this way we ensure that whenever `4p5 is a prefix of `4q5, the discretized payoff
g¯4p5 is comparable to g¯4q5. This implies that the function ` satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.5, thus g¯ has
strong CPL.
Define the function f 2 6−M1M7n × 2F → F as follows: Let y ∈ 6−M1M7n and C ⊆ F. If C is a ≤–chain
and for each x ∈C the points x and y are –comparable, then let f 4y1C5 be an element y¯ ∈ F satisfying the
condition of Lemma 6.3. Otherwise let f 4y1C5 be any element v ∈ F such that v− y< .
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We let `4q5 be the history as in Lemma 6.4. We construct an –discretization g¯
of the function g with the following property: g¯4p5 and g¯4q5 are ≤–comparable whenever `4p5 and `4q5 are
–comparable. By lemma 6.5 this implies that the function g¯ has strong CPL.
Let Ã∗ be any strict well-ordering of P. We define a relation Ã on P as follows: p Ã q precisely when
[`4p5≺ `4q5] or [`4p5= `4q5 and pÃ∗ q]. The relation Ã is well-founded.
Now define the function g¯2 P→ F recursively by
g¯4p5= f 4g4p51 8g¯4q5  q Ã p950 (8)
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We prove that for each p, q ∈ P, g¯4p5 and g¯4q5 are ≤–comparable whenever the plays p and q are Ã–
comparable. Take p ∈ P and let 4p5 be the statement that for every q Ã p, the vectors g¯4q5 and g¯4p5 are
≤–comparable. Note that if p is the Ã–minimal element of P then 4p5 is trivially true. We prove 4p5 by
induction on Ã. Thus suppose 4q5 holds for all q Ã p. We must show that 4p5 holds.
First we argue that 8g¯4q5  q Ã p9 is a ≤–chain. Take q Ã p and r Ã p. We must show that g¯4q5 and g¯4r5 are
≤–comparable. If q = r there is nothing to prove, so assume q 6= r . We know that `4q5 `4p5 and `4r5 `4p5,
so the histories `4q5 and `4r5 are –comparable. Yet this implies that q and r are Ã–comparable, say q Ã r .
Since 4r5 holds, however, we conclude that g¯4q5 and g¯4r5 are ≤–comparable, as desired.
Now we argue that for each q Ã p the points g¯4q5 and g4p5 are –comparable. Indeed we have `4q5 
`4p5 ≺ p and g4q5 − g¯4q5 < . Hence taking x = g¯4q5, Lemma 6.4 implies that g4p5 and g¯4q5 are –
comparable, as desired.
Therefore, the definition of f implies that, for each q Ã p, the points g¯4q5 and g¯4p5 are ≤–comparable. This
proves 4p5.
It is now easy to see that, for each p, q ∈P, if the histories `4p5 and `4q5 are –comparable, then the vectors
g¯4p5 and g¯4q5 are ≤–comparable. Indeed, `4p5 and `4q5 are –comparable precisely when p = q or when p
and q are Ã–comparable.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 6.2. Recall that u is a bounded payoff function with CPL. The following
lemma states that u has a splitting function that exhibits strong CPL. It is constructed by taking the infimum
over all splitting functions for u coordinatewise.
Lemma 6.6. The payoff function u has a splitting function s that exhibits strong CPL.
Proof. Given p ∈P define the set
S4p5= 8y ∈n  u4p5≤ y and for every v ∈Gu4p51 v≤ y or y ≤ v90
Fix some splitting function s′ for u. Then s′4p5 ∈ S4p5, so S4p5 is not empty. For each player i let
si4p5= inf
y∈S4p5
yi
and let s4p5= 4s14p51 : : : 1 sn4p55. We prove that s satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
We first argue that s is a splitting function for u. We check the three conditions of Definition 3.3: (1) That
u4p5≤ s4p5 is obvious; (2) There exists a v ∈Gu4p5 such that s′4p5≤ v, hence s4p5≤ v; (3) Take any v ∈Gu4p5.
Two cases are possible: (A) For every y ∈ S4p5 it holds that v ≤ y. In this case v ≤ s4p5. (B) There exists a
y ∈ S4p5 such that y ≤ v. In this case s4p5≤ v. Hence we have v≤ s4p5 or s4p5≤ v, as desired.
We show that s has strong CPL. Take p ∈P and y ∈Gs4p5. Suppose that the sequence 4pk1 s4pk55 converges
to 4p1 y5. Below we show that, for every  > 0, there exists a K ∈ such that for each k≥K the points s4pk5
and s4p5 are ≤–comparable. This is sufficient, because then there exist infinitely many k ∈ with s4pk5≤ s4p5
or infinitely many k ∈ with s4p5≤ s4pk5. In the first case y ≤ s4p5, and in the second case s4p5≤ y. Since
this is true for every  > 0, we conclude that y ≤ s4p5 or s4p5≤ y.
Fix an  > 0. It can be seen that there exists a K ∈ such that for k≥K the set Gu4pk5 is contained in the
–neighborhood of Gu4p5. That is, for each v ∈Gu4pk5 there exists v′ ∈Gu4p5 such that v′ − v< .4
Fix a k≥K. Each v ∈Gu4pk5 is ≤–comparable to s4pk5 since s is a splitting function for u. Moreover, v is
also ≤–comparable to s4p5 since v is in the –neighborhood of Gu4p5.
Suppose ¬4s4p5 ≤ s4pk55. We argue that s4pk5 ≤ s4p5. Let z = 4z11 : : : 1 zn5 where zi = min8si4p5 + 1
si4pk59. We show that z ∈ S4pk5.
First we argue that u4pk5≤ z. We know that u4pk5≤ s4pk5. Our supposition implies that ¬4s4p5≤ u4pk55.
Yet because s4p5 is ≤–comparable to u4pk5 ∈ Gu4pk5, we must have u4pk5 ≤ s4p5. Now we conclude that
u4pk5≤ z.
Take a v ∈ Gu4pk5. We argue v and z are ≤–comparable. If s4pk5 ≤ v then z ≤ v. If v ≤ s4pk5 then our
supposition implies that ¬4s4p5 ≤ v5. Since v is ≤–comparable to s4p5, however, we must have v ≤ s4p5.
Thus v≤ z.
This proves that z ∈ S4pk5. However, then s4pk5≤ z≤ s4p5.
To conclude, s4pk5 is ≤–comparable to s4p5, as desired. 
4 Indeed, suppose otherwise. By passing to a subsequence, if necessary, we obtain a sequence of vk ∈Gu4pk5 such that for all k ∈ and all
v′ ∈Gu4p5 it holds that v′ − vk ≥ . The sequence vk is bounded since the payoffs are bounded. Hence, it has a convergent subsequence.
Replacing the sequence by a subsequence we can assume that vk converges, say to a point v ∈ n. Since Gu is a closed set, we have
v ∈Gu4p5. Hence v− vk ≥  for all k ∈, leading to a contradiction.
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By the above lemma u has a splitting function that exhibits strong CPL. Fix one such splitting function s.
Clearly, −M ≤ si4p5≤M for each p and each i. The next approximation result is the counterpart of Lemma 6.4
for the CPL rather than strong CPL.
Lemma 6.7. For each q ∈P, there exists a history `∗4q5≺ q such that, for each p `∗4q5 and each x ∈ F
with s4q5− x< , the points u4p5 and x are –comparable.
Proof. Suppose that there is a q ∈ P such that for every history h ≺ q there is a p  h and x ∈ F with
s4q5− x<  such that the points u4p5 and x are not –comparable. Then there is a sequence pt ∈ P and
xt ∈ F such that pt → q, s4q5− xt<  but the points u4pt5 and xt are not –comparable. As F is a finite
set we can take xt to be a constant sequence, xt = x. Since u has bounded range, by taking a subsequence we
may assume that u4pt5 converges, say to a point y ∈Gu4q5. Because u has CPL, y are s4q5 are ≤–comparable.
As s4q5− x < , the points y and x are –comparable. But then u4pt5 and x are –comparable for t
sufficiently large, thus yielding a contradiction.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6.2. The proof uses the function f introduced earlier, and the fact
that the splitting function s has strong CPL, and hence admits an –discretization by Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. By Theorem 6.1 the splitting function s has an –discretization, i.e., a strong CPL
function s¯2 P→ F such that s4p5− s¯4p5< . Take ¯`4p5 to be a history as in Lemma 6.5 for g¯ = s¯. Let `∗4p5
be as in Lemma 6.7. Now let m4p5 denote the longer of the histories ¯`4p5 and `∗4p5.
For p ∈P define
C4p5= 8s¯4q5  q ∈P1 m4q5≺ p90
Note that the set C4p5 is a ≤–chain by the choice of the function m. Moreover, u4p5 is –comparable to
every point in C4p5 by Lemma 6.7.
Let P0 = 8p ∈P  s¯4p5 u4p59 and let P1 be the complement of P0 in P. Define
u¯4p5=
{
s¯4p5 if p ∈P0
f 4u4p51C4p55 if p ∈P10
Clearly, u¯ has finite range. Now we argue that u¯4p5−u4p5< . For p ∈P1 this follows from the definition
of f . Now take p ∈P0. Then for every i we have s¯i4p5− < ui4p5≤ si4p5 < s¯i4p5+. Hence ui4p5− s¯i4p5< .
Therefore ui4p5− u¯i4p5< . This shows that u¯ is an –discretization of u.
We show that u¯ has CPL with s¯ being the splitting function. We verify the three conditions of Definition 3.3:
(1) For p ∈ P0 we have u¯4p5 = s¯4p5. For p ∈ P1 it is not the case that s¯4p5  u4p5. It follows by the
definition of f and because s¯4p5 ∈C4p5 that u¯4p5≤ s¯4p5.
(2) For p ∈ P0 we have u¯4p5 = s¯4p5. The condition is satisfied since u¯4p5 ∈ Gu¯4p5. Take a p ∈ P1. There
exists a v ∈Gu4p5 such that s4p5≤ v. Then s¯4p5 v. Let 84pk1 u4pk559k∈ be a sequence converging to 4p1 v5.
Then m4p5≺ pk and s¯4p5 u4pk5 for large k. Hence, by the definition of f we have s¯4p5≤ u¯4pk5 for large k.
Replacing the sequence by a subsequence, if necessary, assume that u¯4pk5= v¯ for every k. Then s¯4p5≤ v¯, and
v¯ ∈Gu¯4p5.
(3) Take a 4p1 v¯5 ∈Gu¯ and let the sequence 84pk1 u¯4pk559k∈ converge to 4p1 v¯5. Suppose first that there exists
a subsequence of pk in P0. Replace the sequence with the subsequence. Since u¯4pk5= s¯4pk5 for each k and
since s¯ has strong CPL, v¯ is ≤–comparable to s¯4p5. Now suppose that only finitely many elements of pk are
in P0. Then pk ∈ P1 for k large. Moreover m4p5 ≺ pk and hence s¯4p5 ∈ C4pk5 for large k. By the definition
of f , the vectors u¯4pk5 and s¯4p5 are ≤–comparable. Hence v¯ and s¯4p5 are ≤–comparable. 
7. Concluding remarks. In this section we discuss two straightforward extensions of Theorem 4.2 for a
payoff function with finite range. For the sake of simplicity we further assume throughout this section that the
payoff function has no ties (for the definition of a tie see §5).
7.1. Induced plays and upper semicontinuity plays. The construction of SPE strategies in §5 allows us
to improve on Theorem 4.2 as follows.
Corollary 7.1. Let u= 4u11 : : : 1 un5 be a payoff function with finite range, no ties, and common prefer-
ences at the limit. Let the strategy profile  be as in Lemma 5.2. Then  is an SPE with the following additional
property: For every h ∈H and for every player i, the payoff function ui is upper semicontinuous at the induced
play 41h5.
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The corollary can be proven as follows: We can assume without loss of generality that each ui only takes
integer values. Let s′ be any splitting function for u. Define a new splitting function s for u as follows. Take a
play p and a player i. If ui4p5 = s′i4p5 and there is a v ∈ Gu4p5 with vi > ui4p5, then let si4p5 = s′i4p5+ 005.
Otherwise, let si4p5= s′i4p5. Since u has no ties, s is indeed a splitting function for u.
By definition, the function s has the following additional property: For each player i and each p ∈ P, if
ui4p5= si4p5, then ui is upper semicontinuous at p.
Let  be a strategy profile as in Lemma 5.2. As shown in the proof of Theorem 4.2, the strategy profile 
is an SPE. Take a history h ∈ H and let p = 41h5. Let h′ be the longer of the two histories h and h4p5,
where h4p5 is defined as in §5. Now Lemma 5.5 implies that u441h′55≥ s4p5. By the choice of h′, we have
41h′5= p. Thus u4p5≥ s4p5, and hence u4p5= s4p5. The choice of the splitting function s now implies that
each ui is upper semicontinuous at p. This completes the proof of the corollary.
One implication of the corollary is that for CPL payoff functions with finite range and no ties, the set of
upper semicontinuity plays is dense as a subset of P. We remark that the denseness of upper semicontinuity
plays alone is not sufficient for the existence of an SPE, not even of an –SPE in behavioral strategies. For a
counterexample, see Flesch and Predtetchinski [6].
Corollary 7.1 cannot be extended to the payoff functions with infinite range, since then the set of upper
semicontinuity plays might be empty even in a one player game. To see this consider a one player game with
the action set A = 81129. Let E be the set of eventually constant plays. For p in E let e4p5 be the period at
which p becomes constant. Define u4p5 to be 0 if p yE, and 2−1/4e4p5+15 if p ∈E. Then u is nowhere upper
semicontinuous. To see this, take any p = 4a01 a11 : : : 5. For any t ∈  let pt = 4a01 : : : 1 at−11 bt1 bt1 bt1 : : : 5
where bt 6= at−1. Then e4pt5= t. Hence lim supt→ u4pt5= 2>u4p5.
7.2. Splitting functions. For a function u2 P → n let ì4u5 denote the game with the payoff function
u= 4u11 : : : 1 un5.
Corollary 7.2. Let u= 4u11 : : : 1 un5 be a payoff function with finite range, no ties, and common prefer-
ences at the limit. Let s be an associated splitting function. Let the strategy profile  be as in Lemma 5.2. Then
 is an SPE in both games ì4u5 and ì4s5.
The proof of the corollary is as follows: Let  be a strategy profile as in Lemma 5.2. As shown in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, the strategy profile  is an SPE for the game ì4u5. For every history h ∈H , the payoff function
u is upper semicontinuous at the induced play 41h5, by Corollary 7.1. Hence, for every h ∈ H , we have
u441h55= s441h55.
Now consider a strategy i for some player i and a history h ∈H . Let p=4/i1 h5. Let h′ be the longer
of the two histories h and h4p5. Then by Lemma 5.5 we have u441h′55≥ s4p5. Since  is an SPE in ì4u5
and since h′ is reached from h by a unilateral deviation to i, we have ui441h55≥ ui441h′55. Combining
the two inequalities we obtain
si441h55= ui441h55≥ ui441h′55≥ si4p5= si44/i1 h550
This completes the proof of the corollary.
Note that the sets of SPEs in ì4u5 and ì4s5 are not nested, i.e., neither one is generally a superset of the
other. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 7.3. Consider a game with only one player and the action set A= 81129. Let E2 denote the set of
plays in which, after some period, only action 2 is played. The payoff function is given by u4p5= 1 if p ∈ E2,
and u4p5 = 0 otherwise. Observe that u satisfies CPL with the splitting function s4p5 = 1 for all p ∈ P. In
particular, condition (2) of Definition 3.3 is satisfied because the set E2 is dense in P. Obviously, any strategy
is an SPE in ì4s5, but not in ì4u5.
Now consider a game with two players playing alternatingly and with the action set A= 81129. Let Ea denote
the set of plays in which, after some period, only action a is played. The payoff function is given by u4p5= 42125
if p ∈E2 and u4p5= 41115 if p ∈E1 and u4p5= 40105 otherwise. Observe that u satisfies CPL with the splitting
function s given by s4p5 = 42125 if p ∈ E2 and s4p5 = 41115 if p ∈ E1 and s4p5 = 410511055 otherwise. The
strategy profile in which both players always choose action 1 is an SPE in ì4u5, but not in ì4s5, because in
ì4s5 each player can guarantee a payoff of at least 1.5 (by choosing actions 1 and 2 alternatingly). Ã
Interestingly, Corollary 7.2 establishes the existence of an SPE for a class of payoff functions that is larger
than just CPL payoff functions. Indeed, there exist games where the payoff function exhibits CPL, whereas a
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corresponding splitting function does not, as the example below illustrates. This calls for a precise characteri-
zation of all payoff functions that are a splitting function for some CPL payoff function. We leave this question
for further research.
Example 7.4. We construct payoff functions u and s with the following properties: u exhibits CPL, s is a
splitting function associated with u, and s does not exhibit CPL.
There are two players. At any history, player 1 is the active player. The set of actions is 8a1 b1 c9. Let B
denote the set of plays in which player 1 chooses action b at least once, and action c is not chosen before the
first occurrence of b. Similarly, let C denote the set of plays in which player 1 chooses action c at least once,
and action b is not chosen before the first occurrence of c. Furthermore, let B denote the set of plays in which
player 1 chooses action b infinitely often, and let C denote the set of plays in which player 1 chooses action c
infinitely often.
The payoffs are given for each play p as follows:
u4p5=

40105 if p= 4a1a1a1 : : : 5
40105 if p ∈ B and p y B
42115 if p ∈ B and p ∈ B
40105 if p ∈C and p yC
41125 if p ∈C and p ∈C0
Note that Gu4p5 = 8401051 421151 411259 for p = 4a1a1a1 : : : 5, and Gu4p5 = 8401051 421159 for p ∈ B, and
Gu4p5= 8401051 411259 for p ∈C. It is straightforward to verify that u exhibits CPL with the splitting function s
given by:
s4p5=

41115 if p= 4a1a1a1 : : : 5
42105 if p ∈ B and p y B
42115 if p ∈ B and p ∈ B
40125 if p ∈C and p yC
41125 if p ∈C and p ∈C0
Clearly, s does not exhibit CPL, as Gs4p5= 8411151 421051 421151 401251 411259 for p= 4a1a1a1 : : : 5. Ã
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